Article 74 — Tasks of the Chair

Article 74 identifies the core procedural and organisational responsibilities of the Chair of the European Data Protection Board, or EDPB. The Chair convenes the Board, prepares its agenda, formally notifies binding dispute-resolution decisions and ensures that the Board performs its work on time, particularly within the GDPR’s consistency mechanism.

In the simplest terms:

The Board collectively decides what the EDPB’s position will be. The Chair organises the process through which the Board reaches, communicates and implements that position.

This distinction is crucial. The Chair has significant procedural influence, but is not a president with general executive control over national supervisory authorities. The Chair cannot personally replace the collective decision of the Board or instruct an independent national authority outside the powers conferred by the GDPR.

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1. The place of Article 74 within the EDPB framework

Articles 68 to 76 create the institutional structure of the EDPB:

• Article 68 establishes the Board and its composition;
• Article 69 protects its independence;
• Article 70 defines its tasks;
• Article 71 requires annual reporting;
• Article 72 establishes the voting rules;
• Article 73 governs election of the Chair and Deputy Chairs;
• Article 74 defines the Chair’s tasks;
• Article 75 establishes the Secretariat;
• Article 76 governs confidentiality.

Article 74 is therefore not a complete code of everything the Chair may or must do. It must be read with the surrounding provisions and with the EDPB Rules of Procedure.

The Article gives the Chair three express responsibilities:

1. convene Board meetings and prepare the agenda;
2. notify Article 65 decisions;
3. ensure the timely performance of the Board’s tasks.

Paragraph 2 then requires the Board to allocate responsibilities between the Chair and the two Deputy Chairs in its Rules of Procedure.

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2. The Chair is the EDPB’s procedural leader, not its sole decision-maker

The Chair’s functions are significant, but the EDPB remains a collegial body.

The Board, not the Chair acting alone, adopts:

• guidelines;
• recommendations;
• Article 64 opinions;
• Article 65 binding decisions;
• Article 66 urgent opinions or binding decisions;
• annual reports;
• Rules of Procedure.

The Chair’s responsibilities generally concern:

• timing;
• organisation;
• agenda management;
• formal communication;
• supervision of the Secretariat;
• representation of the Board;
• procedural coordination.

Illustration

A concerned supervisory authority argues that a lead authority’s draft decision is legally incorrect. The Chair may:

• ensure that the matter is put before the Board;
• organise the relevant meeting;
• supervise circulation of the dispute file;
• manage the voting process;
• notify the decision after adoption. The Chair cannot personally decide: “The objection is correct, and the lead authority must amend its decision.” That conclusion must be adopted by the EDPB under Article 65. The correct institutional relationship is therefore: The Chair manages and represents the EDPB’s decision-making process. The Board makes the substantive institutional decision.

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3. Article 74(1)(a): Convening meetings

The first express task of the Chair is to convene EDPB meetings.

To convene a meeting means more than announcing a date. It normally involves ensuring that:

• the meeting is called lawfully;
• members receive adequate notice;
• the date and format are specified;
• the agenda is circulated;
• relevant documents are available;
• participants know the procedure;
• translation or technical arrangements are made;
• voting and representation requirements can be satisfied.

The EDPB’s Rules of Procedure regulate plenary meetings, extraordinary meetings, participation, written procedures, expert groups and other operational matters. Version 8 of the Rules of Procedure, adopted on 6 April 2022, remains the latest published version listed by the EDPB.

3.1 Ordinary meetings

Ordinary meetings deal with the Board’s continuing work, such as:

• guidance;
• consistency opinions;
• legislative advice;
• enforcement cooperation;
• international transfers;
• certification;
• annual reporting;
• institutional administration.

Illustration

The EDPB is preparing guidance on anonymisation. The Chair may convene a plenary meeting at which members:

• discuss the latest draft;
• consider stakeholder submissions;
• propose amendments;
• decide whether the document is ready for adoption. The Chair ensures that the meeting occurs and is properly organised. The Board decides whether to adopt the guidance.

3.2 Extraordinary and urgent meetings

Some matters cannot wait until the next ordinary plenary.

Examples

include:

• an Article 66 urgent request;
• an imminent statutory deadline;
• a major legislative development;
• an urgent international-transfer matter;
• a serious dispute requiring rapid consideration.

Illustration

A supervisory authority requests an urgent EDPB binding decision under Article 66. The Board must act within two weeks. The Chair may need to convene:

• an extraordinary plenary;
• accelerated expert-group meetings;
• a written voting procedure;
• a mixed remote and physical meeting. The power to convene is therefore directly tied to the EDPB’s ability to meet legally binding deadlines.

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4. Power to convene is also a duty

Article 74 says that the Chair“shall” convene meetings. This is not merely a discretionary privilege.

Where a matter legally requires Board consideration, the Chair must facilitate that consideration.

The Chair should not refuse to convene a meeting because:

• the issue is politically controversial;
• the Chair’s national authority disagrees with the referral;
• the controller is economically important;
• the Commission prefers delay;
• the matter may divide EDPB members;
• the eventual outcome may criticise the Chair’s own authority.

[!example] Illustration The Chair’s national supervisory authority is the lead authority in an Article 65 dispute. Several concerned authorities challenge that lead authority’s draft decision. The Chair cannot delay convening the Board merely to protect the Chair’s national authority from an unfavourable outcome. Article 69 requires independent performance of EDPB functions, while Article 74 requires the timely handling of the dispute.

5. Preparing the agenda

The Chair must also prepare the agenda for EDPB meetings.

Agenda preparation is operational, but it can have substantial legal and institutional effects.

The agenda determines:

• which subjects will be discussed;
• the sequence of discussion;
• which matters are for information;
• which documents require a vote;
• which matters are confidential;
• how much time is allocated;
• whether a decision is expected.

Illustration

The Board must consider:

1. an Article 65 dispute with an approaching deadline;
2. draft guidance with no statutory deadline;
3. an administrative update.

A rational agenda should ordinarily prioritise the Article 65 dispute because missing its statutory deadline would have greater legal consequences.

The Chair therefore exercises judgment when preparing the agenda, but that judgment must be exercised:

• impartially;
• transparently within the institution;
• consistently with statutory deadlines;
• without suppressing valid matters;
• in cooperation with members and the Secretariat.

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6. Agenda-setting power is influential but not unlimited

Control over an agenda can influence institutional outcomes. A matter that is repeatedly postponed may never receive a vote. A complex question placed last may receive inadequate discussion.

For that reason, the Chair must not use agenda control to:

• block a valid Article 64 referral;
• suppress a relevant and reasoned objection;
• avoid an Article 65 dispute;
• prevent consideration of a Commission request;
• delay a matter until urgency disappears;
• disadvantage a particular authority;
• predetermine the Board’s substantive conclusion.

Illustration

A member validly requests that the Board examine a matter of general application under Article 70(1)(e). The Chair may need to assess:

• readiness;
• available documentation;
• relationship with pending work;
• resource implications. The Chair may reasonably schedule the issue for a future meeting. But indefinitely refusing to place it on any agenda without objective reasons could undermine the member’s statutory right and the Board’s consistency role.

6.1 The agenda is not the Chair’s personal policy programme

The agenda belongs institutionally to the EDPB.

The Chair may propose priorities, but cannot create EDPB policy merely by:

• excluding unwanted topics;
• controlling all drafting;
• preventing votes;
• withholding documents.

The Board’s Rules of Procedure, member rights and general principles of good administration limit agenda discretion.

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7. Adequate notice and preparation

Effective participation requires members to receive enough information and time to prepare.

The Chair should work with the Secretariat to ensure that members receive:

• agenda;
• draft documents;
• supporting evidence;
• proposed amendments;
• legal analysis;
• relevant translations;
• voting information.

Illustration

The Board is asked to adopt a 150-page Article 65 decision concerning complex AI profiling. If the final draft is circulated minutes before the vote, members may be unable to:

• assess the evidence;
• understand the legal issues;
• consult internally;
• identify procedural errors;
• exercise their vote responsibly. Even if the GDPR sets a short deadline, the Chair must organise the work to preserve meaningful deliberation as far as possible. Timeliness means acting efficiently. It does not mean sacrificing reasoned decision-making.

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8. Can the Chair change the agenda during a meeting?

Practical developments may require agenda amendments.

Examples

include:

• a late urgent request;
• withdrawal of an item;
• newly discovered procedural defects;
• system failure;
• absence of essential participants;
• unforeseen developments. The applicable Rules of Procedure govern how changes are made.

Illustration

During a plenary, the EDPB receives evidence of an urgent data exposure affecting several countries. The Chair may propose adding an urgent discussion. However, adding an item requiring an immediate binding vote may be inappropriate if:

• members lack documentation;
• the affected party has not been heard;
• the voting procedure cannot be satisfied;
• the Board lacks competence. Agenda flexibility cannot be used to bypass due process.

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9. Chairing the meeting

Although Article 74(1)(a) expressly refers to convening meetings and preparing agendas, the wider institutional framework naturally requires the Chair to preside over EDPB meetings.

This may involve:

• opening and closing the meeting;
• confirming quorum;
• introducing agenda items;
• giving speakers the floor;
• managing time;
• identifying proposed amendments;
• clarifying the question to be voted on;
• announcing the result;
• ensuring that minutes are prepared;
• maintaining order.

The Rules of Procedure address the duties of the Chair and Deputy Chairs and the Board’s meeting arrangements.

9.1 Neutrality during debate

The Chair may hold a legal view and, as an EDPB member, may participate in discussion. But when presiding, the Chair should ensure fair participation.

Illustration

The Chair strongly supports one interpretation of legitimate interests. During the meeting, the Chair should not:

• prevent opposing members from speaking;
• misstate their amendments;
• end debate only after supporters have spoken;
• manipulate the voting question. The Chair may advocate a position while respecting procedural fairness and collegiality.

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10. Article 74(1)(b): Notification of Article 65 decisions

The Chair’s second express task is to notify Article 65 decisions to:

• the lead supervisory authority;
• all supervisory authorities concerned.

Article 65 decisions resolve specified disputes concerning:

• relevant and reasoned objections;
• the identity of the competent lead authority;
• failure to seek or follow an Article 64 opinion.

The EDPB decision is binding on the supervisory authorities concerned. Article 74 makes the Chair the formal channel through which that binding decision is communicated.

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11. Notification is not ordinary information-sharing

Notification is a legally significant procedural act.

Under Article 65(6), the lead authority or, where applicable, the authority with which the complaint was lodged must adopt its final decision:

• without undue delay;
• no later than one month after being notified of the EDPB decision.

Therefore, the Chair’s notification starts a legally important deadline.

Illustration

The EDPB adopts a decision on 1 September. The Chair formally notifies the relevant supervisory authorities on 4 September. The one-month period under Article 65(6) is connected to notification on 4 September, not merely the internal adoption date. The notification record should therefore clearly establish:

• date;
• time;
• recipients;
• decision version;
• attachments;
• method of delivery;
• confirmation of receipt. A casual public announcement or press release should not be treated as a substitute for formal notification.

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12. Who must be notified?

Article 74 identifies:

1. the lead supervisory authority;
2. the supervisory authorities concerned.

The term “supervisory authority concerned” comes from Article 4(22). An authority may be concerned because:

• the controller or processor is established in its territory;
• data subjects in its territory are substantially affected or likely to be substantially affected;
• a complaint has been lodged with it.

Illustration

A controller’s main establishment is in Ireland. Its processing substantially affects individuals in France, Germany and Spain, and complaints have been lodged in those countries. The Irish authority is the lead authority. The French, German and Spanish authorities may be concerned authorities. The Chair must notify all authorities entitled to receive the Article 65 decision, not merely the lead authority.

12.1 Article 65(1)(b) and (c) cases

The identity of “authorities concerned” may be less straightforward where the EDPB decision concerns:

• a dispute about which authority is competent;
• failure to request an Article 64 opinion;
• refusal to follow an EDPB opinion.

The Chair should identify all authorities whose competence or statutory responsibilities are affected by the binding decision.

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13. What should the notification contain?

A proper notification should include:

• the final adopted decision;
• operative part;
• reasons;
• adoption date;
• voting information required by the procedure;
• confidentiality classification;
• information about publication;
• relevant procedural instructions;
• any annexes.

Illustration

The EDPB decides that:

• an objection concerning Article 6 is relevant and reasoned;
• the lead authority must find an additional infringement;
• the proposed fine must be reassessed. If the Chair sends only a summary stating “the objection succeeded,” the lead authority may not know precisely how to implement the decision. The complete reasoned decision must be communicated.

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14. Notification does not itself create the EDPB decision

The Board adopts the Article 65 decision through the applicable voting process. The Chair then notifies it.

These are separate legal events.

Illustration

The Board validly adopts a decision on Monday. The Chair notifies it on Wednesday. The decision exists as an adopted EDPB act from Monday, but the supervisory authorities’ implementation deadline begins from the legally relevant notification on Wednesday. The Chair cannot alter the decision during notification. If the Board adopted one operative part, the Chair cannot:

• rewrite it;
• add a new infringement;
• delete a requirement;
• change the fine methodology;
• modify the reasons substantively. The Chair’s task is to transmit the Board’s decision accurately.

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15. Mistakes in notification

A notification may contain:

• wrong recipient;
• missing annex;
• incorrect version;
• corrupted file;
• ambiguous date;
• mistranslation;
• incomplete decision.

The Chair and Secretariat should correct material errors promptly.

Illustration

The lead authority receives a draft version rather than the final adopted decision. The final-decision deadline should not reasonably be calculated as though the correct binding decision had been validly and completely notified. The exact legal consequence depends on:

• seriousness of the defect;
• whether the recipient understood the decision;
• whether prejudice occurred;
• when the correct version was supplied;
• applicable procedural law. Technical mistakes should not casually defeat the consistency mechanism. At the same time, authorities should not be bound by deadlines triggered through an unusable or materially incorrect notification.

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16. Publication is distinct from notification

Article 65(5) coordinates notification and publication.

The Chair first notifies the supervisory authorities. The EDPB decision is published after the final national supervisory decision has been notified.

This sequencing protects procedural order.

Illustration

The EDPB requires a lead authority to find additional infringements against a named controller. Publishing the EDPB decision before the controller receives the final national decision could:

• surprise the controller publicly;
• affect market reputation;
• interfere with national notification;
• undermine procedural fairness. Therefore:
• notification is formal communication to the relevant authorities;
• publication is disclosure of the decision to the public at the legally appropriate stage. The Chair and Secretariat must coordinate these processes carefully.

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17. Article 74(1)(c): Ensuring timely performance

The third express duty is the broadest.

The Chair must ensure the timely performance of the Board’s tasks, particularly those relating to the Article 63 consistency mechanism.

Relevant deadlines include:

• eight weeks for an Article 64 opinion, subject to extension;
• one month for an Article 65 decision, subject to further periods;
• two weeks for an Article 66 urgent opinion or decision;
• procedural periods established under the Rules of Procedure;
• timeframes requested by the Commission under Article 70(2);
• annual reporting obligations under Article 71.

Illustration

A draft BCR approval is referred for an Article 64 opinion. The Chair should ensure that:

1. the file is checked;
2. documents are circulated;
3. translation is organised;
4. the relevant expert subgroup begins work;
5. the opinion is placed on the plenary agenda;
6. voting occurs before the deadline;
7. the opinion is communicated and published.

The Chair does not personally perform every step. The Chair ensures that the institutional process performs them on time.

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18. “Ensure” does not mean guarantee the impossible

The Chair cannot control every event.

Delay may result from:

• incomplete referral files;
• late evidence;
• technical failures;
• extensive translation;
• litigation;
• emergency developments;
• lack of member consensus;
• need to hear affected parties.

The duty to ensure timely performance is best understood as a duty of active management.

The Chair should:

• monitor deadlines;
• identify delays;
• escalate problems;
• convene additional meetings;
• request missing documents;
• reallocate resources;
• activate written procedures;
• explain unavoidable delays;
• use statutory extensions where available.

Illustration

An Article 64 referral lacks the draft national decision and supporting reasons. The Chair cannot produce a legally sound EDPB opinion from an incomplete file. Timely performance may require the Chair to:

• identify the missing materials immediately;
• ask the referring authority to complete the file;
• avoid unnecessary internal delay once the file is complete. The referring authority’s deficiency does not excuse the EDPB from managing the matter diligently.

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19. Priority of statutory deadlines

Not all EDPB work has the same urgency.

The Chair may need to prioritise:

1. Article 66 urgent matters;
2. Article 65 statutory disputes;
3. Article 64 opinions;
4. Commission advice with an identified urgency;
5. guidance and recommendations without fixed statutory deadlines;
6. longer-term administrative projects.

Illustration

The EDPB is preparing general guidance on data minimisation when an urgent Article 66 request arrives concerning exposure of children’s health information. The Chair may reasonably reallocate staff and meeting time toward the urgent request. This does not mean that general guidance may be delayed indefinitely. The Chair must balance:

• statutory urgency;
• affected rights;
• legal deadlines;
• institutional workload;
• existing commitments.

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20. Timeliness and quality

Speed is not the only measure of proper administration.

A decision adopted quickly but based on:

• incomplete evidence;
• no hearing;
• inaccurate translation;
• misunderstood objections;
• defective voting

may be unlawful.

The Chair must ensure that the Board acts both:

• on time;
• lawfully.

Illustration

The Article 65 deadline is approaching. The controller has not been given access to a new allegation that could lead to an additional infringement. The Chair should not simply force an immediate vote to meet the deadline. Appropriate action may include:

• arranging an accelerated hearing;
• using a lawful extension;
• narrowing the decision to issues properly ready for resolution;
• ensuring that due process is preserved. Timeliness cannot override the Charter or essential procedural safeguards.

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21. Special importance of the consistency mechanism

Article 74(1)(c) singles out the Article 63 consistency mechanism.

That mechanism includes:

• Article 64 opinions;
• Article 65 binding decisions;
• Article 66 urgency procedures.

These procedures prevent fragmented interpretation of the GDPR across Europe.

The Chair’s responsibility is critical because procedural delay could cause:

• inconsistent national measures;
• prolonged uncertainty;
• ineffective rights protection;
• expiry of emergency measures;
• delayed complaint decisions;
• inconsistent international-transfer mechanisms.

[!example] Illustration One national authority proposes standard contractual clauses. Until the Article 64 process is complete, the authority cannot adopt the draft measure. Unnecessary EDPB delay could prevent organisations from using the proposed clauses and create prolonged legal uncertainty. Conversely, rushing the opinion could allow defective clauses to be widely used. The Chair must manage both interests.

22. The Chair’s other GDPR responsibilities

Article 74 is not exhaustive. Other GDPR provisions give the Chair additional functions.

These include:

• representing the Board under Article 68(2);
• requesting an Article 64(2) opinion;
• indicating the reasonable period for objections under Article 64(3);
• communicating Article 64 information and opinions;
• notifying Article 65 decisions;
• exercising the Article 65(3) casting role in a final tied vote;
• directing the Secretariat under Article 75;
• communicating Board activities to the Commission under Article 68(5).

The Chair may request an Article 64(2) opinion on a matter of general application or a matter producing effects in more than one Member State. Article 64 also permits the Chair to set a reasonable objection period for certain circulated draft decisions.

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23. Article 64(2): Chair’s ability to request an opinion

The Chair may ask the EDPB to examine:

• a matter of general application;
• a matter producing effects in more than one Member State.

[!example] Illustration National authorities are adopting materially different interpretations of whether AI models trained on personal data can be treated as anonymous. The Chair may consider that a common European opinion is needed and initiate the Article 64(2) process. This does not allow the Chair to dictate the opinion’s content. The Board examines and adopts its institutional view under the Article 64 procedure. The request power is therefore an agenda-triggering power, not a substantive deciding power.

24. The “reasonable period” under Article 64(3)

For certain Article 64(1) draft decisions, a member that does not object within the reasonable period specified by the Chair is deemed to agree.

The length of that period may significantly affect participation.

Illustration

A draft binding corporate rules decision contains:

• complex group structures;
• extensive transfer arrangements;
• several legal annexes;
• multiple languages. A two-day objection period may not be reasonable. Relevant factors include:
• document length;
• complexity;
• urgency;
• prior circulation;
• translation needs;
• technical questions;
• member workload;
• statutory deadline. The Chair must set a period that balances:
• meaningful review;
• timely completion. A period designed to suppress objections would be inconsistent with good administration and the Board’s collegial structure.

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25. The casting vote under Article 65(3)

If the EDPB cannot adopt an Article 65 binding decision by the required two-thirds majority within the earlier periods, the final fallback stage uses simple majority.

Where votes are evenly divided at that final stage, the Chair’s vote decides.

This is an exceptional power.

Illustration

At the final Article 65 voting stage:

• 14 members support the proposed conclusion;
• 14 oppose it. The Chair’s vote determines the result. This does not mean that the Chair generally has two votes. Nor does it mean that the Chair can break ties in every guideline, opinion or election. The casting power is:
• confined to Article 65(3);
• used only at the final fallback stage;
• activated only by an equal split. It should not be described as a general presidential power.

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26. Relationship with the Secretariat

Recital 140 explains that the Board should be assisted by a Secretariat provided by the EDPS and that staff performing EDPB tasks should work exclusively under the Chair’s instructions.

Article 75 states that the Secretariat provides:

• analytical support;
• administrative support;
• logistical support;
• internal and external communication;
• translation;
• meeting preparation;
• drafting and publication of opinions and decisions.

The EDPB’s official description confirms that Secretariat staff are employed by the EDPS but work under the EDPB Chair’s instructions for EDPB functions.

26.1 Why the Chair directs the Secretariat

The EDPS supplies the staff, but the EDPB has separate legal personality and institutional independence.

Without the Chair’s directing role, the EDPS could potentially control:

• EDPB priorities;
• document drafting;
• meeting arrangements;
• communication;
• procedural timetables.

The Chair’s instruction power preserves functional separation.

26.2 The Chair does not employ Secretariat staff personally

The Chair’s authority is functional and institutional.

The Chair may direct EDPB tasks, but ordinary employment matters remain within the applicable staff and EDPS administrative framework.

[!example] Illustration The Chair may instruct the Secretariat: “Prepare the Article 65 file for the 15 September plenary.” The Chair cannot disregard EU employment law or treat individual staff members as personal employees.

27. Limits on instructions to the Secretariat

The Chair’s instructions must be:

• lawful;
• connected with EDPB work;
• consistent with Board decisions;
• consistent with the Rules of Procedure;
• respectful of professional duties;
• compatible with rights of defence;
• consistent with confidentiality.

Illustration

The Board adopts an opinion requiring specified amendments. The Chair cannot instruct the Secretariat to publish a materially different version reflecting the Chair’s personal preference. Similarly, the Chair cannot instruct staff to:

• conceal relevant evidence;
• manipulate voting records;
• delete official documents unlawfully;
• disclose confidential information;
• disregard a court order. The Secretariat serves the Board through the Chair. It does not serve the Chair’s private interests.

28. Article 74(2): Allocation between Chair and Deputy Chairs

Paragraph 2 requires the Board to establish the allocation of responsibilities between:

• the Chair;
• the two Deputy Chairs.

The allocation must be contained in the EDPB Rules of Procedure.

This serves several objectives:

• clarity;
• continuity;
• accountability;
• manageable workload;
• substitution;
• conflict management;
• institutional resilience.

The published Rules of Procedure include an Article 7 dealing with the duties of the Chair and Deputy Chairs.

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29. Why the Board, not the Chair alone, controls allocation

The Chair cannot unilaterally redesign the distribution of leadership powers.

The Board must establish the framework in its Rules of Procedure, which Article 72 requires to be adopted by a two-thirds majority.

This prevents the Chair from:

• marginalising both Deputies;
• transferring all powers to one preferred Deputy;
• creating a new leadership hierarchy;
• withholding all meaningful responsibilities;
• changing substitution arrangements for personal advantage.

[!example] Illustration The Chair proposes that one Deputy handle international matters and the other handle enforcement cooperation. The Chair may present the proposal after consultation, but the allocation must operate within the framework approved by the Board.

30. Types of tasks that may be allocated

The Rules may divide responsibilities for:

• external representation;
• specific policy portfolios;
• stakeholder engagement;
• international cooperation;
• enforcement coordination;
• temporary substitution;
• chairing meetings;
• signing documents;
• supervision of particular projects.

Illustration

The Board may allocate:

• legislative and international representation to one Deputy;
• enforcement cooperation and expert-support projects to the other;
• overall coordination and formal notification to the Chair. The precise allocation may change after elections or because of workload, but it must remain consistent with the Rules and statutory responsibilities.

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31. Temporary non-availability or incapacity

The allocation should address what happens where the Chair is:

• ill;
• travelling;
• temporarily unavailable;
• unable to act because of conflict;
• absent during an urgent request.

Illustration

An Article 66 request arrives while the Chair is medically unavailable. The designated Deputy should be able to:

• activate the Secretariat;
• convene the necessary meeting;
• supervise the urgent process;
• perform the Chair’s relevant functions. Without clear substitution rules, urgent European protection could depend on one person’s availability.

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32. Delegation versus transfer of responsibility

The Chair may delegate certain functions, but delegation does not necessarily remove the Chair’s overall responsibility.

Illustration

The Chair authorises a Deputy to sign routine correspondence. The Deputy signs on behalf of the Chair. This does not mean that the Deputy has permanently become the Board’s statutory representative under Article 68(2). Similarly, the Chair may ask a Deputy to chair one meeting but remains responsible within the institutional allocation unless the Deputy is formally acting as Chair under the Rules. The scope of delegation should be:

• clear;
• documented;
• lawful;
• revocable where appropriate;
• communicated to relevant actors.

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33. External representation by others

The Rules may allow the Chair to designate:

• a Deputy Chair;
• another Board member;
• a supervisory-authority official;
• Secretariat staff

to represent the EDPB externally in a specific context.

Illustration

A specialist conference concerns cryptographic anonymisation. The Chair may designate a technical expert from a national authority to present the EDPB’s adopted guidance. The representative must:

• accurately communicate the Board’s position;
• remain within the mandate;
• avoid presenting personal views as EDPB conclusions;
• respect confidentiality. External representation does not permit the designee to create new EDPB policy during the event.

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34. Conflicts involving the Chair’s national authority

A difficult grey area arises where the Chair’s own national authority is:

• the lead authority in an Article 65 dispute;
• criticised by concerned authorities;
• involved in related litigation;
• the subject of a consistency problem.

The Chair is simultaneously:

1. the head or representative of a national authority;
2. a member of the EDPB;
3. the institutional Chair.

That combination requires careful safeguards.

Illustration

The Chair’s national authority issued the disputed draft decision. The Chair should not use:

• agenda control;
• meeting procedure;
• Secretariat instructions;
• notification power to favour the national authority’s position. Depending on the circumstances and Rules, appropriate safeguards may include:
• a Deputy Chair presiding;
• transparent allocation of procedural functions;
• restricting the Chair’s access to certain internal management decisions;
• documenting the conflict arrangement. Prior institutional involvement does not automatically disqualify the Chair because the EDPB is composed of national authority heads. A personal or financial conflict would be more serious. The key requirements are impartiality, procedural fairness and public confidence.

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35. Failure by the Chair to perform Article 74 tasks

A failure may involve:

• refusing to convene a required meeting;
• omitting a valid matter from the agenda;
• notifying only some concerned authorities;
• materially delaying notification;
• failing to monitor statutory deadlines;
• manipulating Secretariat work;
• withholding documents;
• acting under improper external instructions.

Possible consequences may include:

• internal Board intervention;
• reallocation to a Deputy;
• criticism in annual reporting;
• amendment of the Rules;
• dismissal under the Rules of Procedure;
• judicial challenge to an affected EDPB act;
• Ombudsman or other administrative scrutiny.

Illustration

The Board adopts an Article 65 decision, but the Chair deliberately delays notification for six weeks to benefit the controller. The delay could:

• postpone the national final decision;
• harm complainants;
• undermine Article 65;
• constitute a breach of Article 74;
• raise independence and good-administration concerns. The legal remedy would depend on who was affected, the nature of the delay and the available procedural route.

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36. Can the Chair be legally responsible for every delay?

No.

The Chair’s duty is institutional and managerial. The existence of delay does not automatically prove personal misconduct.

A proper assessment should ask:

• Was the file complete?
• Did the Chair act promptly?
• Were members cooperative?
• Was translation required?
• Did the affected party need to be heard?
• Was there a system failure?
• Were lawful extensions used?
• Did the Chair escalate the problem?
• Was the delay avoidable?

[!example] Illustration A lead authority submits an incomplete Article 65 referral and takes three weeks to provide essential evidence. The Chair should identify and communicate the deficiency promptly. But the missing material cannot automatically be attributed to the Chair. By contrast, if a complete file lies untouched because the Chair does not schedule it, the responsibility is more direct.

37. Procedural influence and judicial review

The Chair’s actions may affect the legality of an EDPB decision.

Potentially significant defects include:

• improper notice of meeting;
• denial of meaningful member participation;
• incorrect agenda procedure;
• failure to respect hearing rights;
• misuse of casting vote;
• incorrect notification;
• failure to apply an Article 65 deadline;
• material conflict of interest.

Not every defect necessarily invalidates the final act.

Courts may consider:

• whether the rule was essential;
• whether the error affected the outcome;
• whether a party suffered prejudice;
• whether the defect was corrected;
• whether the Board would necessarily have reached the same result.

[!example] Illustration The agenda labels an item incorrectly, but all members received the full correct decision and voted knowingly. The error may be harmless. If members were led to believe they were voting on a non-binding opinion when the act was actually an Article 65 binding decision, the defect would be much more serious.

38. Recital 140

Recital 140 is the main recital directly relevant to Article 74.

It explains that:

• the EDPB is assisted by a Secretariat;
• the EDPS provides that Secretariat;
• staff performing EDPB tasks act exclusively under the Chair’s instructions;
• those staff report to the Chair for EDPB work.

The recital supports two institutional principles.

First, the Chair needs operational control to fulfil Article 74’s duties.

Second, the EDPB must remain functionally separate from the EDPS even though the EDPS supplies its staff.

[!example] Illustration The EDPS holds one legal view, while the EDPB adopts another. Secretariat staff working on the EDPB document must implement the EDPB’s adopted position under the Chair’s institutional direction. They cannot substitute the EDPS’s separate preference.

39. Corrections and qualifications to the supplied commentary

Several points require refinement.

39.1 The Chair’s powers are not merely an extension of general Board autonomy

The Chair has only those powers provided by:

• the GDPR;
• the Rules of Procedure;
• lawful Board decisions.

39.2 Convening and agenda preparation are significant but not absolute powers

The Chair cannot suppress mandatory referrals or manipulate the agenda to predetermine substantive outcomes.

39.3 The casting vote is strictly limited

It applies only at the final Article 65(3) fallback stage where votes are equally split.

39.4 Article 64(2) gives the Chair a referral power, not a power to determine the opinion

The Board retains collective decision-making authority.

39.5 A “reasonable” objection period must allow meaningful examination

Reasonableness depends on complexity, urgency, translation and prior circulation.

39.6 The Secretariat acts under the Chair for EDPB tasks

The Secretariat is provided by the EDPS, but its EDPB work follows separate reporting lines and the Chair’s instructions.

39.7 External representation does not create substantive decision-making power

A person designated to represent the EDPB externally must communicate adopted positions and remain within the authorised mandate.

39.8 Allocation to Deputy Chairs remains subject to Board-approved rules

The Chair may propose or implement allocation, but cannot unilaterally rewrite the leadership structure.

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40. Complete practical illustration

Assume that the Irish supervisory authority refers an Article 65 dispute concerning a multinational platform.

The concerned authorities disagree about:

• lawful basis;
• special-category data;
• the proposed corrective order;
• the fine.

Stage 1: Receipt and filing

The Secretariat receives the referral.

Under the Chair’s institutional supervision, it checks:

• draft decision;
• objections;
• lead-authority response;
• evidence;
• controller submissions;
• completeness.

Stage 2: Agenda and meeting

The Chair:

• monitors the statutory deadline;
• convenes the necessary meetings;
• places the dispute on the agenda;
• ensures documents are circulated;
• organises translation;
• allocates preparatory work.

Stage 3: Hearing and deliberation

The Board considers:

• whether objections are relevant and reasoned;
• evidence;
• controller’s response;
• legal issues;
• appropriate corrective action.

The Chair manages debate but does not personally decide the merits.

Stage 4: Vote

The Board votes under Article 65.

If the required two-thirds majority is not reached during the earlier periods, the matter moves to the fallback stage.

If the final fallback vote is equally divided, the Chair’s vote decides under Article 65(3).

Stage 5: Notification

After adoption, the Chair formally notifies:

• the Irish lead authority;
• every concerned authority.

That notification starts the national one-month implementation period.

Stage 6: National decision and publication

The lead authority adopts its final national decision on the basis of the EDPB decision.

After the national decision is notified, the EDPB decision is published in accordance with Article 65.

This example shows that the Chair controls the procedural engine, while the EDPB collectively determines the legal outcome.

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Conclusion

Article 74 makes the Chair responsible for ensuring that the EDPB is not merely a legal body on paper but a functioning European decision-making institution. The Chair must:

• convene meetings;
• prepare agendas;
• organise timely deliberation;
• notify Article 65 binding decisions;
• monitor consistency-mechanism deadlines;
• direct the Secretariat for EDPB work;
• represent the Board;
• coordinate responsibility with the Deputy Chairs. These functions are powerful because procedure affects substance. A delayed meeting, incomplete agenda, unreasonable objection period or defective notification can affect:
• the ability of authorities to participate;
• the rights of controllers and complainants;
• the timing of national decisions;
• the legality of EDPB acts;
• consistent GDPR enforcement. But the Chair’s power remains bounded. The Chair:
• does not replace the EDPB plenary;
• cannot command national supervisory authorities generally;
• cannot rewrite a Board decision during notification;
• has no general veto;
• has no general casting vote;
• cannot suppress valid referrals;
• must act independently and impartially;
• remains subject to the GDPR, the Charter and the Rules of Procedure.

Paragraph 2 adds institutional resilience by requiring the Board to define how the Chair and Deputy Chairs divide their responsibilities. This ensures that EDPB work continues during absence, incapacity, conflict or heavy workload.

The simplest summary is:

The Board decides, the Chair makes sure the Board is able to decide lawfully and on time, and the Deputy Chairs ensure that this work does not depend entirely on one person.