Article 73 — Chair

Article 73 establishes how the European Data Protection Board chooses its leadership and how long that leadership may remain in office. Although the provision is brief, it raises important questions about eligibility, voting, representation, continuity, renewal, resignation, loss of membership, dismissal, institutional independence and the limits of the Chair’s authority.

In simple terms:

The EDPB chooses its own Chair and two Deputy Chairs from among its members. They serve for five years and may be elected once more, producing a maximum possible tenure of ten years in the same office.

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1. Purpose of Article 73

The EDPB is a collective body composed primarily of the heads of national data protection authorities and the European Data Protection Supervisor, or their authorised representatives. A collective body of that size requires stable leadership to:

• organise its work;
• coordinate meetings;
• represent it externally;
• manage deadlines;
• facilitate consensus;
• supervise the Secretariat’s work;
• ensure that opinions and decisions are notified properly;
• maintain continuity across changing national memberships.

Article 73 provides that structure by creating three elected leadership positions:

1. one Chair;
2. two Deputy Chairs.

The official text requires all three to be elected from among the Board’s members by simple majority for five-year terms renewable once.

Article 73 does not itself describe all their functions. Those functions are mainly found in:

• Article 68(2), under which the Chair represents the Board;
• Article 74, which lists the Chair’s tasks;
• Article 75, concerning the Secretariat;
• the EDPB Rules of Procedure.

Article 73 is therefore principally about selection and tenure, while Article 74 is mainly about functions.

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2. Article 73 does not establish a traditional hierarchy

The supplied commentary describes Article 73 as establishing the Board’s “hierarchical framework.” That expression requires care.

The EDPB is a collegial body. The Chair is not the superior officer of national supervisory authorities and cannot generally command them as subordinates.

The Chair cannot ordinarily:

• direct a national authority to open an investigation;
• decide an Article 65 dispute alone;
• impose a fine personally;
• veto a plenary decision;
• overrule the Board’s vote;
• change the GDPR;
• dictate how every EDPB member must vote.

The Chair leads, coordinates and represents the Board. The Board itself adopts its formal positions under the GDPR’s voting rules.

Illustration

Several concerned authorities object to a lead authority’s draft decision. The Chair may:

• ensure that the dispute is placed on the EDPB agenda;
• supervise the procedural timetable;
• facilitate discussion;
• ensure that the Board receives the necessary material;
• represent the adopted decision publicly. The Chair cannot personally decide whether the objection is relevant and reasoned and then impose that personal conclusion as the EDPB’s binding decision. The Board must adopt the decision under Article 65. A more accurate description is: Article 73 establishes the EDPB’s elected leadership structure, not a chain of command over national regulators.

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3. Why three leadership positions are needed

The EDPB has a large and demanding workload. It may need to handle:

• Article 64 consistency opinions;
• Article 65 binding decisions;
• Article 66 urgent cases;
• legislative advice;
• international-transfer questions;
• stakeholder consultations;
• guidance on new technologies;
• cooperation among national authorities;
• public and international representation.

One Chair may not be available for every meeting, hearing, conference or urgent procedure. Two Deputy Chairs provide:

• continuity;
• workload distribution;
• replacement capacity;
• institutional resilience;
• broader leadership participation.

Illustration

The Chair is unavailable when an urgent Article 66 request arrives. A Deputy Chair may carry out the necessary functions assigned under the Rules of Procedure so that:

• the urgent procedure begins;
• documents are circulated;
• the required meeting is organised;
• the two-week deadline is respected. Without Deputy Chairs, absence or conflict affecting one individual could delay the entire Board.

3.1 Deputies do not automatically possess every power simultaneously

The two Deputy Chairs assist the Chair and may act in substitution or perform allocated responsibilities.

Their function does not mean that there are three persons independently able to speak conclusively for the EDPB on the same issue.

The Rules of Procedure should determine:

• substitution order;
• delegated functions;
• representation arrangements;
• what happens during a temporary absence;
• what happens when the Chair has a conflict.

This protects the Board from contradictory institutional communication.

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4. Election by the Board

Article 73 provides that the Board itself elects the Chair and Deputy Chairs.

They are not appointed by:

• the European Commission;
• the European Parliament;
• the Council;
• a national government;
• the EDPS acting alone;
• the EDPB Secretariat.

This internal election supports the Board’s independence under Article 69.

Illustration

The Commission believes that a particular national authority head would make an effective Chair. The Commission may have a view, but it has no EDPB vote and cannot appoint the person. The voting members of the EDPB make the choice. This is institutionally important because the Chair may later represent EDPB positions that criticise:

• Commission proposals;
• Member State laws;
• international-transfer arrangements;
• national supervisory practices. A Chair dependent on appointment by one of those political actors could appear less independent.

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5. Election “from amongst its members”

Only an EDPB member may be elected.

Under Article 68(3), the Board is composed of:

• the head of one supervisory authority from each Member State, or the respective representative;
• the EDPS, or its representative.

The Commission participates without being a member entitled to vote. EEA/EFTA supervisory authorities participate in GDPR-related EDPB work but are expressly excluded from voting and from election as Chair or Deputy Chair under the EEA arrangements.

Article 73 therefore excludes an external candidate such as:

• a former judge who is not an EDPB member;
• an academic;
• a privacy lawyer;
• a Commission official;
• a company DPO;
• a civil-society representative;
• a former supervisory authority head who no longer sits on the Board.

[!example] Illustration A highly respected academic has exceptional expertise in data protection and institutional governance. The EDPB cannot elect that person as Chair unless the person first lawfully becomes an EDPB member through the structure established by Article 68. The requirement ensures that Board leadership comes from within the supervisory system.

6. Must the candidate personally be the head of a national authority?

Article 68 permits the head of a supervisory authority or the head’s representative to participate as the Board member.

Article 73 says that the Chair must be chosen from “amongst its members.”

This raises a technical question: could a person who participates merely as an occasional representative of the authority head stand for election?

The more persuasive interpretation is that candidates should have a stable and legally recognised membership status, not merely attend one meeting as a temporary substitute.

The purpose of a five-year chairmanship requires:

• institutional continuity;
• authority to represent the member;
• a reliable link with the national supervisory system;
• eligibility throughout the term.

A person attending one plenary because the authority head is temporarily absent should not automatically become eligible for a five-year EDPB office.

The EDPB’s public election materials refer in practice to candidates who are heads of national DPAs. For the 2023 election, the EDPB identified the candidates as heads of the relevant national authorities.

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7. Can the EDPS become Chair?

The EDPS is an EDPB member under Article 68(3). The literal wording of Article 73 does not expressly exclude the EDPS from standing for Chair or Deputy Chair.

Accordingly, the EDPS appears legally eligible in principle.

However, this possibility creates institutional questions because:

• the EDPS provides the EDPB Secretariat;
• the EDPS has its own separate supervisory mandate;
• Article 68(6) limits EDPS voting rights in certain Article 65 cases;
• Article 75 requires functional separation between the Board and the EDPS;
• the Chair directs the Secretariat concerning EDPB tasks.

This could concentrate several roles in one office:

1. EDPB member;
2. provider of the Secretariat;
3. independent supervisor of EU institutions;
4. Chair of the EDPB.

That concentration would not necessarily be unlawful, but it would require careful management of:

• conflicts;
• functional separation;
• confidentiality;
• voting restrictions;
• Secretariat instructions;
• public accountability.

7.1 Limited voting rights do not automatically make the EDPS ineligible

The supplied commentary suggests that the EDPS’s limited Article 65 voting rights make an EDPS Chair impracticable.

That is not conclusive.

A Chair does not acquire a vote where the underlying member lacks one. If the EDPS had no vote in a particular Article 65 case, serving as Chair would not automatically create a voting right.

Similarly, the Chair’s casting role under Article 65(3) would have to be reconciled carefully with Article 68(6). It would be difficult to argue that election to the chairmanship expands the EDPS’s voting entitlement beyond the statutory limitation.

Thus:

• EDPS membership creates potential eligibility;
• Article 68(6) continues to limit voting in relevant cases;
• institutional practicality is different from formal eligibility.

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8. EEA/EFTA members cannot stand for office

The EEA/EFTA supervisory authorities of Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway participate in EDPB GDPR work. However, the EEA incorporation arrangements exclude their right:

• to vote;
• to stand for election as Chair;
• to stand for election as Deputy Chair.

Illustration

The head of the Norwegian authority may possess extensive data protection and leadership experience. The person may participate actively in:

• discussions;
• expert subgroups;
• cooperation;
• evidence exchange. But Article 73, read with the EEA adaptations, does not permit that person to be elected Chair or Deputy Chair. This is not a judgment on competence. It reflects the institutional structure of the EEA Agreement and the legal status of EDPB voting acts.

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9. Meaning of simple majority

Article 73 says that the Chair and Deputy Chairs are elected by simple majority.

Article 72 provides the general rule that EDPB decisions are taken by simple majority of its members unless the GDPR provides otherwise.

The EDPB Rules of Procedure refine how this operates in elections. The supplied commentary quotes the procedural rule as requiring a simple majority of members entitled to vote who are present or represented through delegation.

This creates an important distinction between:

• the broad language of Article 72;
• the specific election mechanics in the Rules of Procedure.

9.1 Practical meaning

In an election, the relevant pool is the members:

• entitled to vote;
• participating personally; or
• validly represented through permitted delegation.

The procedure must also comply with:

• quorum requirements;
• nomination rules;
• ballot rules;
• any successive voting rounds.

[!example] Illustration There are 27 national voting members. Twenty-five are present or validly represented. A candidate may need a simple majority calculated under the EDPB’s applicable election rule, rather than a majority derived from informal counting among those who happen to cast a non-blank ballot. The exact calculation must be taken from the Rules of Procedure in force at the time of the election. The general legal point is: The Chair should have affirmative support from more than half of the relevant voting membership under the valid election procedure, not merely more votes than every other candidate.

10. Relative plurality is not necessarily enough

A simple majority is different from a plurality.

Illustration

Three candidates receive:

• Candidate A: 11 votes;
• Candidate B: 9 votes;
• Candidate C: 7 votes. Candidate A has the most votes, but only 11 of 27. Candidate A has a plurality, not a simple majority. The election may therefore require:
• another round;
• elimination of the lowest candidate;
• further deliberation;
• withdrawal of a candidate. This ensures that the elected Chair receives support from a majority rather than merely being the least opposed candidate in a divided field. During the 2023 Chair election process, the EDPB announced multiple candidates and stated that the election would take place by secret ballot at the 25 May 2023 plenary.

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11. Presence and delegation

The Rules of Procedure permit certain members who are not present to delegate their voting rights to another voting member attending the plenary.

This reduces the risk that:

• travel disruption;
• illness;
• scheduling difficulties;
• urgent national events

prevent a Member State’s supervisory system from participating.

Illustration

The head of one national authority cannot attend the election plenary because of an urgent domestic data breach. If the Rules permit, the member may delegate the vote to another voting member and notify the Chair and Secretariat properly. Delegation should be:

• authorised;
• documented;
• limited to permissible matters;
• notified through the required procedure;
• counted consistently. Delegation is not the same as transferring the EDPB seat permanently. It is a procedural method for exercising the absent member’s vote.

12. Secret ballot

EDPB leadership elections are conducted through secret ballot under the Rules of Procedure. The Board’s 2023 election announcement expressly stated that the election would occur through secret ballot.

Secret voting serves several purposes:

• freedom from governmental pressure;
• freedom from pressure by other supervisory authorities;
• avoidance of retaliation;
• independent assessment of candidates;
• institutional legitimacy.

Illustration

A small Member State’s representative prefers Candidate A but faces pressure from a larger authority to support Candidate B. A secret ballot reduces the practical effect of that pressure.

12.1 Transparency concern

Secret ballots also reduce public visibility.

The public may not know:

• which authority supported which candidate;
• why one candidate was preferred;
• whether regional or political considerations influenced the outcome.

The balance is achieved through transparency about:

• candidates;
• election procedure;
• final result;
• office term.

Individual votes need not necessarily be disclosed for the election to remain accountable.

13. Election of one Chair and two Deputy Chairs

The offices are distinct. The Board does not simply elect a three-person team unless its procedural system specifically structures nominations that way.

Candidates may stand for:

• Chair;
• Deputy Chair;
• potentially different offices in different rounds, subject to applicable rules.

Illustration

Candidate A loses the Chair election. Whether Candidate A may then stand for Deputy Chair depends on:

• election rules;
• nomination deadlines;
• structure of the ballot;
• any withdrawals or supplementary nominations. The GDPR does not prescribe these details. The Rules of Procedure fill the gap.

13.1 No statutory ranking between Deputy Chairs

Article 73 creates two Deputy Chairs but does not itself state that one is the “first” and the other the “second.”

The Rules of Procedure or internal allocation of tasks must address:

• substitution order;
• division of responsibilities;
• handling of simultaneous absence;
• representation assignments.

Neither Deputy Chair should assume permanent superiority over the other unless a valid internal arrangement establishes it.

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14. The Chair represents the Board

Article 68(2) states that the Board is represented by its Chair.

Representation has both legal and public dimensions.

The Chair may:

• communicate adopted EDPB positions;
• represent the Board before other EU institutions;
• represent the Board internationally;
• act in litigation;
• notify opinions and decisions;
• speak publicly on the Board’s work.

The current official EDPB page identifies Anu Talus as Chair and Jelena Virant Burnik and Zdravko Vukić as Deputy Chairs, all elected for five-year terms.

14.1 The Chair represents the adopted position, not a personal policy

Illustration

The Chair personally preferred a different interpretation during internal deliberations, but the Board adopted a guideline by majority. When representing the Board, the Chair must communicate the adopted institutional position accurately. The Chair may express personal views only if it is made clear that those views are not the EDPB’s formal position. This distinction is essential because public statements by the Chair may be treated as authoritative by:

• national authorities;
• controllers;
• courts;
• media;
• civil society.

15. The Chair’s agenda-setting influence

The Chair does not decide substantive matters alone, but leadership can still have significant practical influence.

The Chair may help shape:

• meeting agendas;
• prioritisation;
• timing;
• coordination among subgroups;
• drafting schedules;
• stakeholder engagement;
• public messaging.

Illustration

Several members request guidance on children’s data, artificial intelligence and international transfers. Limited resources make simultaneous completion impossible. The Chair may facilitate an institutional decision on priorities and organise work accordingly. Agenda-setting power must be exercised:

• impartially;
• transparently where possible;
• consistently with Board decisions;
• without suppressing legally required matters;
• without favouring one national authority or stakeholder. The Chair cannot use agenda control to prevent a valid Article 65 referral or delay an urgent Article 66 request because the subject is politically inconvenient.

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16. The Chair is not entitled to a general casting vote

Article 73 does not give the Chair a general power to break every tied EDPB vote.

Article 65(3) specifically provides a Chair’s deciding vote where:

• the EDPB has failed to adopt an Article 65 decision within the earlier periods;
• the final fallback simple-majority vote is split.

The existence of this express rule indicates that the casting vote is exceptional.

[!example] Illustration The Board votes on general guidance and the result is tied. The Chair should not automatically cast a second vote unless a legal rule validly authorises it. The ordinary result is that the proposal fails to secure the required majority. By contrast, at the Article 65(3) fallback stage, the GDPR expressly states that the Chair’s vote decides an equal split. A specific emergency deadlock rule should not be transformed into a general presidential veto or second vote.

17. Article 73 and the Chair’s voting rights

Election as Chair does not create a new EDPB membership separate from the person’s original membership.

The Chair continues to participate on the basis of the underlying EDPB membership.

Illustration

The head of the Finnish authority becomes EDPB Chair. The person does not receive:

• one vote as Finland’s member;
• another ordinary vote as Chair. The person normally has one vote in the rights attached to the underlying membership, plus any specific casting function expressly granted by the GDPR. This prevents leadership from obtaining disproportionate voting weight.

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18. Five-year term

The Chair and each Deputy Chair serve for five years.

A fixed term promotes:

• stability;
• planning;
• institutional continuity;
• independence from short-term pressure;
• ability to complete long-term projects.

Illustration

The EDPB begins a multi-year programme concerning:

• AI guidance;
• cross-regulatory cooperation;
• enforcement coordination;
• technical templates;
• international transfers. A five-year leadership term allows the Chair and Deputies to oversee work beyond one annual programme. A very short term could produce:
• constant campaigning;
• frequent policy shifts;
• weak institutional memory;
• excessive dependence on permanent administrative staff.

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19. Why the term is not indefinite

An unlimited term could create:

• concentration of influence;
• reduced leadership renewal;
• institutional stagnation;
• excessive personalisation of the Board;
• barriers for other members.

The five-year term balances:

• continuity;
• accountability;
• rotation;
• new perspectives.

It also broadly corresponds to several EU institutional cycles, but the EDPB Chair is not appointed as part of the political cycle of the Commission or Parliament. The EDPB independently conducts its own election.

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20. Renewal once

A term is renewable once.

This means that the same person may ordinarily serve no more than two terms in the same office.

Two terms of five years produce a maximum possible tenure of ten years.

Illustration

A Chair serves from 2023 to 2028 and is re-elected for 2028 to 2033. The person cannot ordinarily be elected for a third Chair term beginning in 2033.

20.1 Renewal is not automatic

The words “renewable once” mean that the person may stand again. They do not create a right to another term.

A serving Chair must:

• remain eligible;
• be nominated under the applicable procedure;
• obtain the necessary majority;
• continue to be an EDPB member.

[!example] Illustration A Chair performs effectively but loses the re-election vote. The term ends after five years. Good performance does not legally guarantee renewal.

21. Consecutive and non-consecutive terms

Article 73 does not expressly say whether the two terms must be consecutive.

The ordinary interpretation of “renewable once” is that the office may be held for two terms in total, whether or not a break occurs between them.

Otherwise, the term limit could be avoided through alternating officeholders.

Illustration

A person serves:

• one Chair term;
• leaves the chairmanship for five years;
• later seeks election again. A second Chair term might be permissible because the term has been renewed once. After completing that second term, a further break should not reset the statutory limit and permit a third Chair term. The purpose of limiting renewal is to avoid indefinite personal tenure, not merely consecutive tenure.

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22. Does service as Deputy Chair count against Chair terms?

Article 73 separately refers to:

• the Chair;
• Deputy Chairs.

It does not expressly say that service in one office counts toward the term limit of another.

The better interpretation is office-specific.

Illustration

A person serves five years as Deputy Chair and is then elected Chair. That person has begun the first Chair term, not a renewed Chair term. Potentially, the person could serve:

• two terms as Deputy Chair;
• later two terms as Chair. subject to continued Board membership and valid election. That could produce a very long period within EDPB leadership. This may raise governance concerns, but the GDPR does not expressly impose a combined ten-year maximum across all three offices. The Rules of Procedure cannot create a restriction contrary to Article 73, but they may regulate nominations and succession consistently with the GDPR.

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23. Continued EDPB membership during the term

Because the Chair and Deputy Chairs must be elected from among EDPB members, continued membership is normally a condition for remaining in office.

Illustration

The Chair ceases to be the head of the relevant national supervisory authority and no longer lawfully represents that authority on the EDPB. The person can no longer satisfy the “from amongst its members” requirement. The chairmanship should therefore end unless another lawful basis preserves EDPB membership. The CNIL’s description of the EDPB states that renewable office is conditional on the individual remaining head of the national data protection authority. This creates a practical interaction between:

• national supervisory authority terms;
• EDPB membership;
• the five-year European leadership mandate.

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24. National appointment periods may be shorter

A national supervisory authority head may have a domestic term that expires before the five-year EDPB term ends.

[!example] Illustration A national authority head is elected EDPB Deputy Chair in 2025. The person’s national mandate ends in 2027 and is not renewed. Even though the EDPB term nominally lasts until 2030, loss of EDPB membership would ordinarily end the Deputy Chair role in 2027. Article 73’s five-year period therefore means: Up to five years, provided the person remains eligible and the office does not otherwise end under the applicable rules. It does not guarantee that the person can retain EDPB office after losing the underlying membership qualification.

25. Vacancy before the end of the term

A vacancy may arise because of:

• resignation;
• death;
• removal;
• loss of EDPB membership;
• prolonged incapacity;
• expiry of national office;
• conflict preventing continued service.

Article 73 itself does not explain:

• who temporarily substitutes;
• when a new election must occur;
• whether the replacement serves a full five-year term;
• whether the replacement merely completes the remaining period.

The Rules of Procedure fill these institutional gaps.

25.1 Full term or remainder?

The text says that the term of office is five years. This suggests that a newly elected replacement begins a new five-year term from election, rather than merely completing the predecessor’s remaining period, unless the Rules validly provide otherwise.

The EDPB’s 2023 election materials and the 2024 Deputy Chair announcement describe terms as beginning from the date of election. The Croatian authority’s announcement concerning Zdravko Vukić states that Article 73 terms begin on election and last five years, renewable once.

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26. Resignation

The GDPR does not expressly set out a resignation procedure.

The Rules of Procedure may therefore regulate:

• notice;
• effective date;
• notification to members;
• temporary substitution;
• new election.

Illustration

The Chair wishes to resign for personal reasons. A proper procedure should ensure:

1. written resignation;
2. clear effective date;
3. temporary exercise by a Deputy Chair;
4. prompt election of a successor;
5. continuity of urgent and pending matters.

A Chair cannot be forced to remain in office for the full five-year term. But resignation should be managed in a way that avoids institutional uncertainty.

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27. Dismissal

Article 73 does not expressly mention dismissal. The EDPB Rules of Procedure regulate circumstances in which the Chair or a Deputy Chair’s term may end and provide for dismissal through an internal decision.

Dismissal raises significant legal issues because leadership independence should not be weakened by allowing removal merely because the majority dislikes a lawful but unpopular view.

Potential legitimate grounds may include:

• serious misconduct;
• inability to perform duties;
• major breach of confidentiality;
• conflict of interest;
• loss of eligibility;
• serious breach of the Rules;
• persistent failure to perform functions.

[!example] Illustration The Chair discloses confidential Article 65 deliberations to a private party. Dismissal may be justified after a fair process. By contrast, removing the Chair simply because the Chair publicly defended an EDPB position that upset a government would raise Article 69 independence concerns.

28. Procedural fairness in dismissal

Even where the Rules permit dismissal by majority, the process should respect:

• clear allegations;
• notice;
• opportunity to respond;
• impartial consideration;
• reasoned decision;
• applicable voting rules;
• judicial review where available.

Illustration

A motion to dismiss is introduced without warning, no reasons are supplied and the Chair is denied an opportunity to answer. Even if the required number of members votes for dismissal, the procedure may be challenged as inconsistent with:

• good administration;
• rights of defence;
• the EDPB’s own Rules;
• institutional independence. Majority voting is necessary, but majority support does not cure every procedural defect.

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29. Re-election and performance assessment

Article 73 does not establish a formal performance-review system before renewal.

Members may nevertheless assess:

• effective chairmanship;
• impartiality;
• management of meetings;
• compliance with deadlines;
• external representation;
• stakeholder engagement;
• handling of urgent procedures;
• respect for collegiality;
• cooperation with the Secretariat.

Illustration

A Chair represents the EDPB effectively but repeatedly suppresses minority views and delays placing valid referrals on the agenda. Members may consider this record when deciding whether to renew the mandate. Re-election is the principal political-institutional accountability mechanism within Article 73, but it operates alongside:

• procedural rules;
• judicial review;
• transparency;
• possible dismissal;
• annual reporting.

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30. Representation and personal continuity

Article 73 elects an individual, not merely the national authority as an institution.

[!example] Illustration The head of the Finnish authority is elected Chair. The chairmanship does not automatically transfer to the person’s successor at the Finnish authority when the original officeholder leaves. The successor becomes the national authority’s EDPB member, but the Board must deal with the resulting Chair vacancy through the proper procedure. This distinction protects the Board’s electoral choice. At the same time, Article 73’s membership requirement means that the individual cannot remain Chair after ceasing to be an eligible EDPB member merely because the five-year term has not expired.

31. Geographic and institutional balance

Article 73 does not require the Board to consider:

• geographic balance;
• population;
• gender balance;
• legal traditions;
• authority size;
• technical expertise;
• linguistic diversity.

But members may consider such factors when choosing leadership.

Illustration

The Board may choose:

• a Chair from one region;
• Deputy Chairs from different regions;
• officeholders with complementary enforcement and technical experience. Such balance may strengthen:
• legitimacy;
• inclusiveness;
• trust;
• representation of different regulatory experiences. However, a formal quota not found in the GDPR should not be treated as legally mandatory unless supported by another valid legal rule.

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32. Independence of the Chair

The Chair remains subject to Article 69.

The Chair must not seek or accept instructions from:

• the Commission;
• a national government;
• the Chair’s national authority in an improper capacity;
• regulated companies;
• political bodies;
• civil-society organisations;
• foreign governments.

Illustration

The Chair’s national government asks the Chair to delay an EDPB opinion that could affect an important domestic company. The Chair must not follow that instruction. The Chair’s dual institutional connection requires care:

• the individual originates from a national supervisory authority;
• the individual represents the EDPB as a European body. When acting as EDPB Chair, the person must act for the Board rather than promoting a national political interest.

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33. Conflicts of interest

A Chair may encounter conflicts where:

• the Chair’s national authority is the lead authority in an Article 65 dispute;
• the Chair previously took a public position;
• the Chair has a personal connection with an affected entity;
• the Chair’s national authority is litigating a connected issue.

Institutional involvement is not automatically disqualifying. The EDPB is composed of supervisory authority heads who regularly have prior views on GDPR matters.

Personal or financial conflicts require more serious safeguards.

Possible measures include:

• disclosure;
• recusal from specified procedural functions;
• substitution by a Deputy Chair;
• restricted access;
• documentation of the arrangement.

[!example] Illustration The Chair’s national authority is defending a draft decision before the EDPB. To protect confidence in the process, a Deputy Chair may perform appropriate procedural functions where the Rules require or permit it. The goal is not to remove knowledgeable members from all discussion. It is to preserve impartiality and the appearance of a fair procedure.

34. Article 73 and current practice

The EDPB’s official page currently identifies:

• Anu Talus as Chair;
• Jelena Virant Burnik as Deputy Chair;
• Zdravko Vukić as Deputy Chair.

It states that they were elected for five-year terms.

Anu Talus was elected Chair on 25 May 2023. The EDPB’s pre-election announcement identified the candidates and confirmed that the vote would take place by secret ballot.

The composition of the Deputy Chairs has changed over time as individual mandates ended and new elections were held. This demonstrates that the three leadership terms do not necessarily begin or expire simultaneously.

Practical consequence

The EDPB can have:

• a Chair elected in one year;
• one Deputy Chair elected in the same year;
• another Deputy Chair elected in a later year. Staggered terms may promote continuity because not all leadership positions become vacant at once.

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35. Article 73 creates no direct duty for private organisations

Article 73 is an institutional governance rule directed at the EDPB.

It does not require an ordinary controller or processor to:

• elect a privacy chair;
• create two deputy privacy positions;
• use five-year terms;
• imitate the EDPB election procedure.

Illustration

A private company cannot be fined under Article 83 simply because its privacy committee elects a Chair for only two years. The company may choose its own governance arrangements, subject to other applicable GDPR obligations, such as independence requirements for a DPO under Article 38. However, Article 73 may have indirect importance for organisations because the Chair:

• represents the EDPB;
• helps organise its agenda;
• communicates guidance and decisions;
• influences institutional priorities through lawful leadership functions.

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36. Relevant Recital 139

Recital 139 is the principal recital relevant to Article 73.

It explains that:

• the EDPB is an independent Union body;
• it has legal personality;
• it is represented by its Chair;
• it consists of national authority heads and the EDPS;
• the Commission participates without voting;
• the Board promotes consistent GDPR application.

The recital helps explain why the Chair must be elected internally.

The person represents an independent Union body composed of supervisory authorities. Appointment by an external political institution would sit uneasily with that design.

Recital 139 does not, however, provide detailed answers concerning:

• voting rounds;
• delegation;
• resignation;
• dismissal;
• vacancy;
• substitution.

Those matters are addressed through Article 73, Article 74 and the Rules of Procedure.

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37. Important corrections and qualifications to the supplied commentary

Several points should be refined.

37.1 Article 73 establishes leadership, not a hierarchy over national authorities

The Chair coordinates and represents the Board but does not command national supervisory authorities generally.

37.2 The EDPS is not expressly ineligible

The EDPS appears eligible in principle as an EDPB member, although voting limitations and Secretariat arrangements create practical complications.

37.3 Right to vote and eligibility are not always identical

EEA/EFTA authorities participate as members for relevant matters but are expressly denied both voting and election rights under the EEA adaptations. EDPS voting restrictions in some Article 65 matters do not necessarily produce a general bar on candidacy.

37.4 The applicable election majority must be read with the Rules of Procedure

The commentary presents a lengthy abstract debate over all members versus those present. The EDPB’s Rules expressly regulate members entitled to vote who are present or represented through delegation.

37.5 The Chair’s casting vote is narrow

It applies at the Article 65(3) final fallback stage, not to every tied Board vote.

37.6 A five-year term does not guarantee five years in practice

The person must remain an EDPB member and may leave earlier through resignation, dismissal, incapacity or loss of national office.

37.7 Renewal once is a possibility, not an entitlement

The officeholder must win another election.

37.8 The term limit is best understood as office-specific

The GDPR does not expressly create a combined ten-year maximum across service as Chair and Deputy Chair.

37.9 The current Deputy Chair composition has evolved

The official EDPB page now lists Jelena Virant Burnik and Zdravko Vukić as Deputy Chairs.

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38. Complete practical illustration

Assume that the current Chair’s term is due to expire.

Stage 1: Notice and nominations

The Secretariat informs members of:

• the vacancy;
• election date;
• nomination deadline;
• applicable Rules.

Eligible EDPB members submit candidacies.

Stage 2: Candidate presentations

Candidates explain:

• leadership priorities;
• management experience;
• approach to consistency;
• cooperation plans;
• stakeholder engagement;
• protection of EDPB independence.

Stage 3: Secret ballot

Voting members participate personally or through valid delegation.

The Commission attends as permitted but does not vote. EEA/EFTA authorities participate but do not vote or stand for office.

Stage 4: Majority assessment

If one candidate receives the necessary simple majority, that person is elected.

If no candidate receives the threshold, further rounds are held under the Rules of Procedure.

Stage 5: Term begins

The elected Chair begins a five-year term.

The Chair:

• represents the EDPB;
• chairs meetings;
• facilitates Board decisions;
• supervises relevant Secretariat work;
• performs Article 74 tasks.

Stage 6: Possible renewal

At the end of five years, the Chair may stand once more if still eligible as an EDPB member.

The Board is free to:

• renew the mandate; or
• elect another member.

Stage 7: Early loss of membership

If the Chair ceases to be the national authority head and loses EDPB membership before the five years end, the office becomes vacant and the applicable substitution and election rules apply.

This example demonstrates that Article 73 combines:

• democratic internal election;
• eligibility tied to EDPB membership;
• leadership stability;
• rotation;
• procedural continuity.

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Conclusion

Article 73 creates the EDPB’s elected leadership model. Its essential elements are:

• one Chair;
• two Deputy Chairs;
• election by the Board;
• election from among EDPB members;
• simple-majority approval;
• a five-year term;
• one possible renewal. The provision serves several objectives. First, it protects independence because leadership is chosen internally rather than appointed by the Commission or national governments. Second, it provides continuity through a substantial five-year term. Third, it prevents indefinite tenure through the one-renewal limit. Fourth, it ensures institutional resilience by providing two Deputy Chairs who can assist and substitute for the Chair.

Fifth, it preserves collegiality because the Chair leads the Board but does not replace the Board’s collective decision-making authority.

The Chair is important, but the Chair is not the EDPB acting alone. Binding decisions, opinions, guidelines and recommendations remain acts of the Board adopted through the procedures and voting thresholds laid down in the GDPR.

The simplest summary is:

The EDPB elects its own leadership from within the European supervisory community. That leadership guides and represents the Board for up to five years at a time, but remains accountable to the Board, bound by the GDPR and limited to a maximum of two terms in the same office.